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"JUSTICE" AND OTHER NON-ECONOMIC
GOALS OF ANTITRUST
Louis B. ScHwA-rz [
(Comments on Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust)
Commissioner Pitofsky's admirable delineation and defense of
the role of political considerations in antitrust law exhibits a moderation not required of an academic like me. I would invoke a
broader range of congressional history to demonstrate the will of
Congress that putative economic gains should not be the exclusive
or decisive factor in resolving antitrust controversies. I would not
yield as freely as he does to the dogma that the antitrust laws protect "competition not competitors," because the goals of justice and
the antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of competitors. I
find, as he does not, clear evidence of congressional purpose to
"create procedural protection for distributors." Far from dismissing such concerns as "playing no useful role" in antitrust interpretation, I see them serving the very useful role of preventing abuse
of power when the growth of power cannot be checked. Further,
I see the role of non-economic considerations not merely as a
"tie-breaker," but as calling for a definite shift in burden of proof
or persuasion, so that practices and structures with anti-competitive potential can be justified only on clear and convincing evidence of economic gain to be passed on to the public. Finally,
I miss in the Pitofsky analysis any reference to that venerable non-economic goal of government, namely justice. Never,
despite repeated demonstrations by economic modelists that price
discrimination may optimize allocation of resources, has Congress
wavered from its adherence to the view that it is "unjust discrimination" to charge different customers different prices for identical
services.'
Regarding the range of congressional manifestations of Congress' willingness to pursue its deconcentration goals if need be at
some economic cost, Professor Pitofsky points out that the noneconomic goals are clear in the legislative history of antitrust enactments supplementing the Sherman Act, and that "arguably . . .
these subsequent expressions define Congress' vague intentions in
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earlier enactments." In this connection, his footnote 31 reminds
us that the antitrust laws constitute an "interrelated network,"
"interlacing statutes."
There are more elements in this network than he mentions or
than is generally appreciated. The Reclamation Act of 1902 limited the sale of water from federal irrigation projects so that no
single owner might benefit for more than 160 acres. 2 In section 11
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 3 Congress
declared its tolerance for giant utility combines if they effected
"substantial economies," 4 but only if they were "not so large

. .

as

to impair the advantages of localized management." 5 The Small
Business Act of 1942 6 declared congressional policy to assure "smallbusiness concerns [a] fair proportion" of government procurement
contracts under arrangements that even permitted the payment of
higher prices to small-business suppliers.7 The Surplus Property
Act of 1944 8 directed the federal government to dispose of war
production facilities under standards that included preference for
smaller purchasers and "strengthen[ing] and preserv[ing] the competitive position of small business concerns." 9 Our banking regulation clearly subordinates "efficiency" considerations to considerations of excessive concentration of power when it seeks to prevent
banks and bank holding companies from extending their operations
into "non-banking" business. 10 A judge or administrator who
wishes to be responsive to the will of Congress can hardly fail to
catch the drift of these legislative enactments. Collectively they
portray a view of the public interest that must pervade the interpretation of the antitrust laws, whether or not one approves of all
these "preferences" for small business.
The non-economic component of American antitrust policy
stands out even more strikingly if one broadens the perspective
243 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
U.S. 275, 294-97 (1958).
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Sys., 491 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
(1st Cir. 1972).

§ 207 of the Federal
§ 488 (1976).
of the Fed. Reserve
Camp, 472 F.2d 427

1078

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:1076

beyond congressional legislation to consider that major historic
event, American imposition of antitrust measures upon conquered
Germany and Japan after World War II. No one then suggested
that our zeal for industrial deconcentration there was an attempt to
impose diseconomies on the defeated. Some believed that the
rapid reconstruction of those devastated economies called for decartelization and decentralization. But clearly the dominant motivation was political: a desire to create alternative centers of power
that could not readily be marshalled behind authoritarian regimes.
I have elsewhere explored "Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness" as a
political theme in the antitrust symphony. 1 Finally, it is well
known that one goal of the antitrust laws is to avert the need for
massive and ongoing government regulation or nationalizationprecisely the political goal that has brought even sophisticated businessmen to join in the American consensus supporting the antitrust
principle, however avidly each businessman may seek exemption for
his own business.
The dogma that "antitrust laws protect competition not competitors" overstates the case and ignores considerations of justice.
One must amend that declaration by adding at least the following
qualification: "unless individual competitors must be protected in
the interests of preserving competition." A conspiracy to put a
single small competitor out of business violates the Sherman Act
even if there is no showing of significant impact on competition
generally. 12 In the Robinson-Patman Act, 13 Congress explicitly
extended the anti-discrimination ban to attempts to eliminate "a
competitor" as well as to cases of impairment of competition.' 4
These may be regarded as instances of Congress' concern with "incipient" impairment of competition or desire to prevent transactions, trivial in themselves, which might "trigger" a series of
similar transactions. But they also may be seen as a congressional
concern for a non-economic goal: "justice," in the sense of fair and
equal treatment of persons in like situations.
That the purpose of the antitrust laws includes "procedural
protection for distributors" seems clear from the Automobile Dealer
"i Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of
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Franchise Act of 1956,15 which undertakes to require auto manufacturers to "act in a fair and equitable manner" in terminating or
failing to renew dealer franchises.'1 This legislation was entitled
"An Act to supplement the antitrust laws of the United States, in
order to balance the power now heavily weighted in favor of autoSome, including myself, may see the
mobile manufacturers." 7
Auto Dealer Franchise Act as misguided or as setting a dangerous
precedent for unwarranted "status" protection of dealers generally,
but it can hardly be denied that Congress here purported to exercise, as part of its antitrust concerns, a supervision over fair procedure and justice in economic relationships. Moreover, cases such
as Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light Co.,' 8 and Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange,2 show that the Sherman Act itself can
be invoked to guarantee procedural fairness when an industry is
engaged in self-regulation. Radiant Burners was given an opportunity to prove that its ceramic burner qualified for the "seal of
approval" by the trade association. Silver was guaranteed notice
and opportunity for hearing before his private wire connections with
an exchange member could be cut off. It is hardly surprising that
the antitrust laws, which the Supreme Court has compared to the
"Magna Carta" and the "Bill of Rights," 20 should incorporate a
strain of fourteenth amendment due process, procedural as well as
substantive.2 1 Similarly, it is easy to detect the fourteenth amendment theme of "equal protection of the laws" (the private commercial laws enacted by dominant firms and oligopolists) in the legislation against price and service discrimination. 22 Others have noted
as relevant to the debate over concentration that there is evidence
that monopolistic enterprises discriminate against blacks more frequently than competitive enterprises.2 3
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976).
-16Id. §§ 1221(e), 1222.
17Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, ch. 1078, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)).
18364 U.S. 656 (1961).
19373 U.S. 341 (1963).
20 United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
("Corporate Regulations as jLaws'
21Cf. A. Bmux, PowEm 373-81 (1967)
under the Fourteenth Amendment").
22 Cf. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963) (citing the House Committee's view that the "'guiding idea" of the Robinson-Patnan Act was "'the
preservation of equality of opportunity as far as possible to all who are usefully
" H.R. REP. No.
employed in the service of distribution and production ...
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6.").
23
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Employment, 14 ANnmusT BuLL. 141 (1969).
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The difficult question is not whether non-economic considerations are a proper, indeed conventional, component of the antitrust
calculus, but how to take them into account. Pitofsky answered at
the conference that political concerns may serve as "tie-breaker in
individual cases," and as "limited factors that influence the way in
which prospective rules are designed to accomplish antitrust objectives." I would go further:
(1) Except in criminal prosecutions, the weight of the noneconomic and non-quantitative goals of antitrust should shift to
anyone seeking to justify a monopoly or a "suspect" anti-competitive
practice the burden of persuading the tribunal that the justification
is established by clear and convincing evidence.2 Such a rule would
operate not merely in cases in which the judge may be left undecided by the economic evidence (a "tie"), but also when he believes
that the balance of evidence slightly favors the justification.
(2) A proper deference to the non-economic goals of antitrust
and to the uncertainties of many economic measurements would
affect the way certain economic testimony is handled. For example,
where there is an issue as to defendant's market share and, as usual,
conflicting market boundaries are supported by evidence, the tribunal might be guided by the rule that the narrowest reasonable
Simgeographic and product boundaries would be accepted. 2
ilarly, when "effect on competition" is the criterion of legality, an
adverse effect in one market should suffice to condemn the transaction without exploring the possible pro-competitive impact in another market. 26 So also a court giving proper deference to the
political elements of the anti-merger laws would "tilt" towards rather
than away from a reasonable administrative judgment that the
acquiring company was a potential entrant.27 Note that these pro24
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964)
(Wyzanski, J.), aff'd with modification of decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
25 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 <1955);
Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Among recent examples of the undermining of prophylactic rules, reflecting
inadequate deference to non-economic goals of antitrust, are Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (repeal of per se prohibition of vertical
territorial restraints; balancing of putative interbrand competitive gains against
obvious loss of intrabrand competition); United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
418 U.S. 602 (1974) (retreating from the rule that mergers would be judged
almost entirely on the basis of market shares and concentration); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
27But see British Oxygen Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1976).
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posals are not confined to "prospective" rule-making, as Pitofsky
suggests, but apply in cases in which existing rules of law are interpreted in application to past transactions.
(3) A proper deference to the non-economic goals of antitrust
and to the unreliability of official discrimination between "good"
and "bad" performance by enterprises would lead to a greater receptivity to per se and other prophylactic antitrust rules. Such rules
concededly bar some transactions for which plausible economic
justifications can be made out. They embody a judgment that the
economic gain infrequently sacrificed in such transactions is more
than counterbalanced by more effective administration in the majority of cases in which both economic and non-economic goals will
be served by strict enforcement.
(4y Recognition of the non-economic goals of antitrust warrants a pro-antitrust resolution of controversies over the bane or
benefit of vertical and conglomerate mergers, the desirability of a
"shared monopoly" approach to oligopoly, and the desirability of
breaking up persistent monopolies even if no "predatory" actions
can be proved.

